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INTRODUCTION
Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) – the three largest of which
are Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch – provide
standardised, easy to understand, and supposedly
independent (third party) assessments of credit quality.
However, the use (and abuse) of credit ratings for asset-
backed securities generally, as well as those collateralized by
and associated with sub-prime residential mortgages in
particular, has today cast a long shadow over the ability of
these “gatekeepers” to provide reliable signals upon which
parties – investors, financial institutions and regulators –
can make informed decisions.
The aim of this short article is to provide a critical
appraisal of CRAs in the light of their role in the subprime
mortgage debacle and to describe and assess the EU’s
recent attempts to regulate them more strictly. The
material is structured around three key questions:
– firstly, given past criticism, how was it that CRAs came
to exert such significant and, seemingly, unchecked
private power?
– secondly, in the context of the recent crisis, how did
CRAs become implicated?
– thirdly, in the light of shortcomings in CRA operations
and assessments, what has the EU’s response been
and to what effect?
QUESTION I
GIVEN PAST CRITICISM, HOW WAS IT THAT CRAs
CAME TO EXERT SUCH SIGNIFICANT AND, SEEMINGLY,
UNCHECKED PRIVATE POWER?
Significantly, even before the recent crisis, the role CRAs
had been the subject of intense scrutiny and long running
criticism. This criticism centred, for example, on claims that:
– ratings were compromised by acute conflicts of
interest;
– CRAs provided little informational value, especially for
more complex asset-backed securities, where
downgrades tended to be reactive rather than
proactive; and
– CRAs were largely unaccountable given the market
power they exerted.
Perhaps the most vivid illustration of CRA failures in the
pre-crisis era was in relation to Enron, where – somewhat
remarkably – Enron’s credit rating was only downgraded a
few days before the company filed for bankruptcy, despite
the fact that its difficulties were widely known.
What is clear today, is that this past scrutiny and
criticism has continued to intensify in the wake of the
recent financial crisis where, to begin with, CRAs were
blamed for causing the crisis; and now – as a result of a wave
of sovereign debt downgrades – they are being criticised
for preventing nation states from extricating themselves
from the economic problems which the crisis has caused.
What is more, the current scrutiny which attaches to CRAs
the world over, follows recent attempts both nationally (eg
in the US where many of the leading CRAs are
headquartered), and internationally (eg through the self-
regulatory efforts of the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO)) aimed at addressing
some of the pre-crisis problems associated with CRA
operations.
The emergence of CRAs as a dominant force in financial
markets is often said to be associated with their so-called
“reputation capital.” CRAs are said to “decode” risks, the
quality of which can be relied upon because CRAs have a
reputation to maintain which they would not want to
jeopardize through shoddy work. CRA assessments of
credit quality help investors to better understand the risks
they face. And the standardised assessments utilised by
CRAs (based on an alphabetical system, with AAA typically
representing the highest grade) can help investors around
the world to establish relatively simplified investment
parameters in investment mandates.
Issuers of securities actively seek out CRA ratings – and
pay handsomely for their services – in the hope that a good
rating will lower their cost of capital and provide them with
a competitive advantage with regard to other issuers.
But, in truth, the increased influence of CRAs as a force
in global financial markets is not so much linked to good
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reputations based on the informational content of their
credit ratings (ie their “reputational capital”). Rather, it is
associated with the fact that regulators – on a global scale
– have sought to harness the claimed informational value
associated with CRA ratings by “enrolling” them, in effect,
as “surrogate regulators” and by using their ratings as a
proxy for regulatory assessments.
More specifically, regulators have sought to devise
frameworks which enable regulated entities – particularly
banks – to rely on external credit ratings to help calculate
risk exposures and thus meet capital adequacy
requirements (the so-called “standardised approach”).
For example, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(an international forum for the world’s leading banking
supervisors) permits banks to use ratings from certain
accredited CRAs to determine minimum credit risk capital
requirements under Pillar I of the Basel Capital Accord
(Basel II). In the EU, these “soft law” principles have also
been embedded in legal rules as part of the EU’s Capital
Requirements Directive 2006/48/EC (CRD) (applicable to
all deposit-takers – except credit unions and certain types
of investment firms) which, inter alia, implements Basel II.
Consequently, in Europe, a CRA’s credit assessments
can, under certain circumstances, be used for capital
requirement purposes in determining the risk weighing
associated with a range of assets held by banks on their
balance sheets. In the US, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) performs a similar service in relation
to CRAs (or “nationally recognised statistical rating
organisations” (NRSROs), as they are officially known in
the US).
In effect, because of this international regulatory
consensus, regulators have vested CRAs with a power to
sell regulatory licences. That is to say, regulators have given
CRAs power to determine who is compliant with
regulatory rules.
However, the recent and unfolding link between CRAs
and the implosion of the market for structured products
generally, and the subprime mortgage market in particular,
has reignited interest in the operation and accountability of
CRAs and in their continuing role as key agencies in which
regulators (and, indeed, investors) can place their faith.
The effect of this interest has been to cast a long shadow
over their alleged reputational capital (the putative source
of their legitimising power) and the exact nature of their
future operations. More specifically, for the purposes of
this article, it has lead to the enactment of EU legislation,
in the form of a Regulation, regulating the operation of
CRAs within the EU (as well as more recent additional EU
proposals) which are likely to have important implications
for the operations not only of CRAs in Europe, but for the
use of their ratings worldwide.
QUESTION II
IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RECENT CRISIS, HOW DID
CRAs BECOME IMPLICATED?
In view of the fact that CRA assessments of credit quality
have, for a number of years, become embedded in
international, regional, and domestic regulatory
frameworks, how did their pre-eminent position come
under challenge, especially with regard to asset-backed
securities?
The “originate and distribute” model of banking
It is widely accepted that the growth of the market for
asset-backed securities, such as subprime mortgages and
so-called structured products, represents a fundamental
shift in the business model utilised by many modern banks.
The traditional “originate and hold” model of banking,
where banks held loans to maturity (and where, as a result,
credit risk was dangerously concentrated), has today given
way to the so-called “originate and distribute” model.
Under this model, banks make loans which are “pooled”
and then sold on to investors through a process of
securitisation. In this way, highly illiquid assets are
transformed into more marketable securities. In the case of
“simple” securitisation there exists a pooling of reasonably
homogenous assets with a given and, generally lower, risk
profile. However, more complex securitsations (so-called
second-tier and higher-tier securitisations) involve a pool
of bank loans being sold by the bank (as the “originator”)
to a bankruptcy remote, off-balance sheet special purpose
vehicle (SPV). Since the SPV is not a subsidiary of the
bank, it does not appear as part of the bank’s consolidated
accounts (hence off-balance sheet). Moreover, in view of
the fact that the SPV is a separate legal entity, the originator
is not legally responsible for its obligations.
A primary motivation behind the use of such structured
investment vehicles by banks is to avoid regulatory
requirements under which they must ordinarily operate,
such as minimal capital requirements and liquidity
requirements, as well as other traditional constraints by
way of reporting and governance obligations.
Having purchased the pool of bank loans/assets, the SPV
is then entitled to the interest payments and the principal
sum made by the original borrowers. In order to pay the
bank for the loan pool, the SPV parcels together these
newly acquired loans into securities which are backed by
the cash flows (interest and principal payments) from the
parcelled loans (hence the term asset-backed securities).
Additional finance is typically secured via short term loans,
which makes such vehicles highly vulnerable in the event
that loan providers lose confidence. Acting on behalf of the
SPV and in return for a fee, the originating bank collects the
stream of cash flows associated with the re-packaged assets.
In an attempt to make the newly issued asset-backed
securities more attractive to investors, various tranches are
issued, each with different risk-return characteristics. In
the event that losses occur, these are, in effect, apportioned
on a sliding scale – typically “senior”, “mezzanine”, and
“equity” – according to investors’ appetite for risk (with
“equity” trances bearing the most risk). In other words
there exists a “credit cushion” whereby the pool of
mortgages or other securitised assets are structured so as to
absorb a certain amount of losses before they are felt by
those further up the chain.
The role of CRAs
CRAs occupied a critical role in facilitating the
spectacular growth of the market for structured products.
Much of this was to do with their supposed superior ability
to assess the credit risk associated with complex credit
instruments. Interestingly, in January 2008, although there
were only 12 triple A-rated companies in the world, there
were as many as 64,000 structured finance instruments
rated triple A.
Because of the claimed ability of CRAs to decode the
special credit risks associated with structured products (a
skill upon which their important position within
international, regional and national regulatory frameworks
was ostensibly predicated), the rating of such securities
became an increasingly lucrative and important source of
revenue for CRAs, sometimes generating fees that were
four and perhaps even five times that which could be
earned by rating equivalent sums of traditional bonds.
What is more, issuers also had strong incentives to seek
ratings for their structured products based on the same
standardised alphabetical scales used to rate more
traditional products. With many financial institutions
embedding ratings within their operating procedures, or
with minimum ratings thresholds contained within
investment mandates, issuers were heavily reliant on
ratings to maximise the pool of potential purchasers of
their securities – a pool which was in fact potentially
worldwide. As a result, there was pressure on issuers to
secure, and an incentive for rating agencies to award, over-
inflated ratings.
The meltdown in the market for residential backed
mortgage securities, which was triggered by the slump in
the US housing market, resulted in an increase in the rate
of defaults on subprime loans. This in turn led to a
significant reduction in the amount of monthly principal
and interest payments derived from the underlying pools of
assets (subprime residential mortgages etc). Although the
junior tranches were hit first, this resulted in a loss of
credit enhancement for the more senior tranches, which in
turn precipitated ratings downgrades on a huge scale.
The ultimate effect of these events was a massive loss of
confidence in credit ratings for structured finance
instruments and vehicles more generally. Moreover,
because of the existence of minimum quality thresholds in
investor mandates, downgrades also had the effect of
triggering through “forced” selling the more
widespread problems currently afflicting the global
financial markets.
Criticisms of CRAs
These events spawned a wave of renewed criticism of
CRAs, much of which mirrors earlier attacks on the
integrity of their operations, and served to intensify the
debate about whether and if so how CRAs are to be
regulated.
(a) Conflicts of interest
Firstly, observers again seized on the acute conflicts of
interest associated with the “issuer pays” model, whereby
both the issuer and the ratings agencies have an economic
interest in ensuring the success of the issue: the issuer, in
ensuring the sale of its securities; and the CRA – because
of scale of fees at stake – in securing lucrative future
business from the issuer. In this sense, ratings became
almost a matter of negotiation rather than one of arm’s
length commercial judgment. Concerns about the
impartiality of ratings also surfaced where CRAs provided
additional advisory services to the issuer (business which
CRAs were loath to forego). Conflict of interest problems
were also thought to be exacerbated by issuers’ willingness
to “ratings shop” so as to choose which rating to use based
on the preliminary rating provided by the agency’s ratings
committee.
(b) Flawed models and tardy downgrades
Secondly, criticism also centred on the methodologies
and assumptions used by CRAs to rate structured
products. Although CRAs claimed that the meltdown in
the structured finance market was “unprecedented”,
attention focused on the models used by CRAs and
criticisms were made that these models failed fully – or
even adequately – to reflect the credit risk associated with
the innovative financial products to which ratings were
assigned.
Linked to this criticism were claims that CRAs were
overly reactive to events associated with the implosion in
the markets for securities backed by US subprime
mortgages − and that they lacked sufficient incentives to
downgrade securities in a timely manner.
(c) Lack of accountability
A third, and final, criticism (again echoing earlier
challenges) revolved around a lack of accountability
associated with the activities of CRAs. Although pre-crisis
is was thought by some that market forces could constrain
and legitimize CRA power, it was widely felt that the
market for ratings suffered from demonstrable market
failures – principally associated with the fact that there are
only three major agencies – which were not likely to be
self-correcting and which were too important to ignore.
What is more, as recent events have all too clearly shown,
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the full costs of the inability of CRAs to assess credit quality
accurately are not confined to the parties immediately
affected. Rather, they are borne by the whole of society by
way of public sector guarantees. These guarantees occur
because of the collateral damage which financial collapses
are capable of inflicting on a wide range of financial actors,
principally banks, and because of the adverse impact which
financial sector dislocations have on the “real” economy.
QUESTION III
IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE CRA SHORTCOMINGS,
WHAT HAS THE EU’s RESPONSE BEEN AND TOWHAT
EFFECT?
Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on Credit Rating
Agencies
Pre crisis – and even amongst some elements within the
EU post-crisis (eg the Committee of European Securities
Regulators (CESR)) – opinion was heavily against direct
regulation of CRAs. Instead, EU authorities almost
unanimously favoured market based approaches,
supplemented by the use of international Codes, under the
auspices of the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO). However, as the unfolding link
between CRA operations and the financial crisis became
clearer, and as the political momentum for “something to
be done” began to mount, self-regulatory approaches were
by-passed in favour of direct regulation. Following a period
of consultation, Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on Credit
Rating Agencies (hereinafter the “CRA Regulation” or the
“Regulation”) was published on November 17, 2009 and
entered into force on December 7, 2009.
Registration and ongoing supervision
In essence the CRA Regulation introduces a harmonised
approach to the regulation of credit rating activities in the
EU. It sets out to achieve this by ensuring that agencies
issuing ratings that are used for regulatory purposes (eg
ratings used to satisfy capital requirements under the CRD)
are subject to a system of registration and ongoing
supervision, and that they are under an obligation to
comply with a comprehensive set of conduct of business
provisions governing issues such as:
– independence;
– conflicts of interest,
– employees and analysts;
– methodologies and models;
– outsourcing; and
– disclosure and presentation of information.
In an attempt to address the global aspect of CRA
operations (where EU investors invest in companies or
financial instruments rated outside the EU, or where, for
the purposes of satisfying capital requirements, banks rely
upon ratings from outside the EU) the CRA Regulation
introduces two regimes: an “endorsement regime” (for
more established CRAs); and a “certification regime” (for
smaller CRAs).
Endorsement
The CRA Regulation makes provision for an endorsement
regime, whereby CRAs established in the EU, and registered
in accordance with the Regulation, may endorse credit
ratings issued by CRAs in third (non-EU) countries provided
certain conditions are met. Most significantly, the endorsing
CRA must demonstrate to its EU regulator that the set of
regulations to which the non-EU entity is subject are, in
substance, at least as stringent as those provided for under
the CRA Regulation (eg measures in relation to
independence and conflicts of interests, rating analysts,
methodologies and disclosure) (Recital 13 and Art 4(3)).
In this way, the EU regime establishes a global benchmark
which third (non-EU) country regimes need to meet in
order for ratings produced by these regimes to have
regulatory effect within the EU. However, according to
Art 4(4), a CRA established in the EU and registered in
accordance with the Regulation must not use the
endorsement regime as a way of circumventing the
requirements of the Regulation.
Equivalence and certification based on equivalence
Furthermore, and with the purpose of catering for
smaller CRAs that are deemed not systemically important
for the financial stability of the financial markets of one or
more Member States, the Regulation establishes a special
certification regime for non-EU CRAs which have no
presence in the EU (Recital 14; Art 5(1),(2)). The effect of
certification is to enable ratings issued by such entities to
be used for regulatory purposes by financial institutions
within the Community without the need for endorsement.
As with the endorsement regime, certain conditions must
be met (which are stipulated in Art 5(1)), paramount
amongst which is that the Commission has adopted an
“equivalence decision” recognising the legal and
supervisory framework of that third country as equivalent
to the requirements of the Regulation. By itself, a
favourable equivalence determination by the Commission
does not automatically entitle CRAs from such third
countries to issue ratings which can be used for regulatory
purposes by financial institutions within the Community.
However, pursuant to Art 5(2) non-EU CRAs may, in the
first instance, submit an application to CESR for
certification provided the relevant conditions as set out in
the Regulation are fulfilled.
Implementation of the CRA Regulation and
proposed reforms
Although the CRA Regulation is directly applicable,
which means it is binding in its entirety and has legal effect
in the UK without needing to be transposed, it also makes
provision for national implementation, for example to deal
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and appeals from registration decisions. In this respect, it
has been implemented in the UK by the Credit Rating
Agencies Regulations 2010 (SI 2010/906).
Significantly, in June 2009, just a few weeks after the
CRA Regulation had been adopted, the European
Commission proposed that the supervisory structure for
CRAs as envisaged by the Regulation, should be amended
in the light of forthcoming structural changes to the EU
financial regulation more broadly. These broader structural
changes were the result of the recommendations of the De
Larosière Report in March 2009. The effect of these
changes for CRAs, is that the European Securities Market
Authority (ESMA) – a proposed new supervisory authority
fashioned from CESR which will be part of a new
European supervisory architecture – will have direct
responsibility for CRAs. This centralised model, which was
envisaged by Recital 51 of the CRA Regulation, will by-pass
the need for the more complex “college arrangements”
established under the Regulation to facilitate cross-border
cooperation and coordination, and will further help to
consolidate the supervisory framework for CRAs. Under
the new proposal, CRAs will apply to ESMA for
registration. In turn, ESMA will monitor on an ongoing
basis whether registered CRAs comply with applicable
rules as set out in the CRA Regulation. ESMA will also be
vested with a full set of supervisory powers (eg information
gathering and enforcement powers), albeit that the transfer
of some of these to national competent authorities (eg the
power to conduct on-site inspections) is foreseen as a
possibility. In essence, the claimed benefits of the proposed
new centralised arrangements are threefold: first, that it
will establish a single point of contact for registered CRAs;
secondly, that it will offer the prospect of a more consistent
application of the relevant rules to CRAs throughout
Europe; and finally, that it will lead to significant efficiency
gains as a result of a more stream-lined system of
registration and supervision.
The most significant consequence of these changes is
that the supervision of CRA activity within the EU will be
further centralised.
CONCLUSION
CRAs have been subject to widespread criticism for their
role in the events associated with the market turmoil of
2008. All told, the above outlined reforms – both enacted
and proposed – represent a formidable albeit flawed
attempt to regulate CRAs: formidable, in the sense that
the Regulation and its accompanying reforms provide for a
comprehensive and highly centralised set of regulatory
controls involving detailed registration requirements and
ongoing supervision; flawed, because despite the use of
endorsement and certification techniques to reflect the fact
that CRA operations are global in scope, the EU’s
regulatory efforts nevertheless risk being seen as overly
protectionist and out of step with international
developments elsewhere, in particular the US.
But perhaps the most interesting and significant longer
aspect of the EU’s regulation of CRAs lies in its proposal
that ESMA should supervise CRAs as from January 2011,
and the readjustment in the balance of power between
ESMA and the various national supervisory authorities that
this would bring. Indeed, these centralising arrangements
could presage a more widespread and potentially more
significant transfer of regulatory powers to the centre in
the field of securities regulation more generally.
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